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ABSTRACT
Conventional models of democratic accountability hinge on citizens’
ability to evaluate government performance accurately. In recent years,
public reporting of governmental performance has expanded in many
policy domains, potentially enhancing citizen capacities to make accu-
rate evaluations. Yet there is little evidence on the degree to which citi-
zen perceptions correspond to actual service quality. Using survey data,
we find that citizens’ perceptions of the quality of specific public schools
reflect available information about the level of student achievement in
those schools. The relationship between perceived and actual school
quality is two to three times stronger for parents of school-age children,
who have the most contact with schools and arguably the strongest
incentive to be informed. A regression discontinuity analysis of an over-
sample of Florida residents confirms that public accountability systems
can have a causal effect on citizen perceptions of service quality, partic-
ularly for those with fewer alternative sources of relevant information.
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Conventional models of democratic accountability hinge on the ability of
citizens to evaluate government performance accurately and base polit-
ical decisions accordingly (Dahl, 1989; Hamilton et al., [1788] 1999).
Accountability policies, such as those now prevalent in American pub-
lic education, aim in part to inform citizens’ perceptions with objective
indicators of government performance, enabling them to meet this necessary
condition. Yet there is little evidence on the degree to which citizen percep-
tions of the quality of government services correspond to publicly reported
data on their actual performance, especially in the context of services pro-
vided by local governments. We investigate two related questions: Do citizen
perceptions of local service quality correspond to objective information on
government performance? If so, does information provided by accountability
programs have a causal effect on those perceptions?
The lack of prior evidence on these questions primarily reflects data
constraints, in particular the difficulties of (1) linking individuals in
nationally representative datasets to local institutions through which
services are delivered and (2) obtaining objective measures of service
quality that are comparable across jurisdictions. Recent developments in
survey research methods and the accountability provisions of the federal
No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 (NCLB) have mitigated these difficulties
with respect to public education. As part of a nationally representative
survey conducted in 2009, we used geographic identifiers to link individual
respondents to specific public schools in their communities and obtained
their subjective ratings of the quality of those schools. We also gathered
publicly available data on student achievement in the same schools, allowing
us to compare respondents’ subjective ratings to objective quality measures
at the institutional level where the service is provided.
Our results indicate that citizens’ perceptions of the quality of local pub-
lic schools do correspond to publicly available information on their perfor-
mance, as measured by student proficiency rates in core academic subjects.
The relationship between actual and perceived school quality is two to three
times stronger for parents of school-age children, who have the most direct
contact with schools and arguably the strongest incentive to be informed.
It is also generally robust to specifications which exploit the fact that indi-
vidual respondents rated multiple schools (i.e., an elementary school and
a middle school) to control for unobserved characteristics of individuals or
neighborhoods that could be correlated with school quality.Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 413
We supplement this national analysis with evidence from an oversample of
residents of the state of Florida, where the state uses a point system based in
part on student test scores to assign each school a letter grade. A regression
discontinuity analysis of respondents whose local schools scored on either
side of the cutoffs used to determine school grades confirms that govern-
ment accountability ratings can have a causal effect on citizen perceptions
of school quality. The effect of accountability ratings appears to be stronger
for nonparents, however, suggesting that elite-generated messages may be
most influential among citizens with less prior information on the issue in
question.
Are Citizens Informed About Government Performance?
Citizens’ evaluations of their government have long been a chief concern in
the study of politics. These evaluations play a crucial role in traditional mod-
els of democratic accountability as well as in modern theories of retrospective
voting, in which voters are thought to assess the state of the world and judge
candidates for elected office accordingly (Fiorina, 1981; Key, 1966). In these
accounts, the electorate is an ‘‘appraiser of past events, past performance,
and past actions,’’ using these judgments to reward or punish public officials
at the ballot box (Key, 1966, p. 61). Retrospective judgment is often cred-
ited for minimizing informational burdens by reducing the voting calculus
to a single heuristic: voters decide whether to support incumbents based on
a judgment about whether the state of the world has improved or declined
during their time in office (Berry and Howell, 2007; Popkin, 1994). However,
the notion of the retrospective voting heuristic as guarantor of democratic
accountability still depends on citizens’ capacity to recognize the state of the
world. If citizens are inattentive to actual conditions, then elected officials
can safely ignore any threat imposed by poor performance.
The notion that voters will judge elected officials based on their perfor-
mance is also central to the recent spread of government accountability and
transparency programs, which are designed to provide citizens with the infor-
mation needed to perform this task. Accountability systems that generate
performance data about schools have become a defining feature of American
public education since the 1990s, particularly since the advent of NCLB. The
theory underlying accountability systems is, in part, that, armed with better
information about school performance, the public will pressure schools to414 Chingos et al.
improve.1 Indeed, public attentiveness to this information is a necessary con-
dition for these systems to generate public pressure. Yet, we have very little
evidence that the public pays attention to the reams of data that account-
ability systems generate. Given the theoretical and practical importance of
citizens’ evaluations of their government’s performance, our understanding
of whether these evaluations are rooted in actual performance remains sur-
prisingly incomplete.
The strongest evidence to date that Americans base their evaluations of
government performance on real-world conditions concerns the roles of the
economy and war in national politics. The relationship between indicators
of economic performance or wartime casualties and such aggregate measures
as presidential job approval (Kenski, 1977; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000;
Mueller, 1973) and election outcomes (Bartels and Zaller, 2001; Campbell,
2008; Hibbs, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000) is well-documented.
The evidence at the individual level, however, is less clear. Although scholars
concur on the strong relationship between individuals’ perceptions of the
economy and their support for incumbents (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000;
MacKuen et al., 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001; Norpoth, 1996), they
debate whether actual economic conditions or political biases drive these
perceptions (De Boef and Kellstedt, 2004; Evans and Andersen, 2006; Evans
and Pickup, 2010; Lewis-Beck, 2006; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008).
Even setting this debate aside, political issues and government activity
extend well beyond the performance of the national economy. This is doubly
true in a federal system like the United States, in which many important
public services are financed and governed by local officials. Yet inquiries into
informed judgment at other levels of government or in more specific policy
domains remain scarce.2
1 For example, President George W. Bush appealed to this purpose in January 2002 when signing
the landmark NCLB legislation aimed at collecting and releasing data on school performance:
“This is the end of a legislative process...But it’s just the beginning of change. And now it’s
up to you, the local citizens of our great land, the compassionate, decent citizens of America,
to stand up and demand high standards, and to demand that no child — not one single child
in America — is left behind” (White House Oﬃce of the Press Secretary, 2002).
2 The literatures on local and urban politics have explored the individual and contextual sources
of satisfaction with speciﬁc public services, yielding a number of valuable insights. Subjective
evaluations of quality vary across several demographic characteristics including age, race,
income, and homeownership (DeHoog et al., 1990; Hero and Durand, 1985). For example,
African Americans tend to report poorer quality of government service (Durand, 1976; Schuman
and Gruenberg, 1972). Attitudinal variables, most especially political eﬃcacy and community
attachment, also predict perceptions of quality (Lyons and Lowery, 1989; Stipak, 1977), as doCitizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 415
This is not to say that scholars have failed to recognize the importance of
this concern. Rather, the primary roadblock to addressing these questions
has been the lack of data on the quality of government services that are com-
parable across jurisdictions. Political scientists examining the link between
perceived and actual quality of government services have had little choice but
to rely on subjective measures, most commonly using average perceptions
within a jurisdictional unit as the benchmark against which to compare indi-
vidual perceptions (Beck et al., 1987; DeHoog et al., 1990). Unfortunately
this amounts to comparing what individuals think about service quality
to what those around them think, an exercise which offers little insight
into whether their quality assessments are informed by data on their actual
performance.3
We advance this literature by analyzing citizen evaluations of performance
in a key area of local government service: public education. In so doing,
we make at least two contributions. First, by comparing perceptions of
government performance to actual performance measured on a common
scale across jurisdictions, we fill a key gap in the literature on the sources of
satisfaction with government. Second, we assess whether the public release of
performance information shapes those perceptions. Accountability systems
potentially subsidize the costs of information acquisition, but whether these
such contextual variables as government structure, racial heterogeneity, and income distribu-
tion (DeHoog et al., 1990; Lowery and Lyons, 1989; Lyons and Lowery, 1989; Schuman and
Gruenberg, 1972). Yet these analyses either neglect or take for granted the role played by true
diﬀerences in service quality. It is not enough to know how individual and contextual char-
acteristics are related to citizens’ evaluations of their government; assessing the prospects for
democratic accountability requires understanding the extent to which these evaluations reﬂect
actual conditions on the ground.
3 A related set of studies in public administration has gone further in addressing this issue.
Motivated by a practical concern with validating performance measurements rather than a
theoretical concern with democratic governance, these scholars compare survey-based evalua-
tions of service quality to administrative performance measures. Although the general thrust
of this research indicates that subjective evaluations of services are not strongly related to
administrative measures (Kelly, 2003; Parks, 1984; Stipak, 1979), consensus remains elusive
(e.g., Van Ryzin et al., 2008). The divergent results stem from the piecemeal character of the
data collection strategies that have been employed. Comparable performance metrics across
jurisdictions are rare, so much of this work relies on case studies of select locations within
which there may be little variation in service quality. Eﬀorts to build standardized survey-based
and administrative performance measures across jurisdictions, such as work undertaken by the
International City/County Management Association (ICMA), have to date yielded only a small
number of voluntary participants (Kelly, 2003; Kelly and Swindell, 2002), posing sample size
and selection bias problems.416 Chingos et al.
subsidies inform citizen judgments of government performance remains
unknown.
Information Costs and Perceptions of School Quality
Although not specifically directed at evaluations of government perfor-
mance, multiple generations of survey research characterize American
citizens as inattentive to and ill-informed about public affairs (e.g., Bar-
tels, 1996; Campbell et al., 1960; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Neumann,
1986). To the extent that citizens think about public affairs at all, their judg-
ments are more likely to be colored by partisan orientations, prejudices, and
other preferences than to be informed by ‘‘objective’’ facts (Bartels, 2002).
From this vantage it appears unlikely that citizen perceptions of the quality
of government agencies would be closely linked to actual performance.
In the case of public schools there is additional reason to suspect that
citizen evaluations could be biased by a reliance on indicators unrelated to
quality. For example, perceptions of school quality may be influenced by the
racial or socioeconomic makeup of a school’s student body. In a study of
St. Louis parents participating in a voluntary desegregation program, Wells
(1993) concluded that parents’ choices about which school to attend were
based ‘‘on a perception that county is better than city and white is better
than black, not on factual information about the schools.’’4 Similarly, pref-
erences over other school characteristics (e.g., a belief that modern facilities
or smaller class sizes are superior) could lead citizens to rate schools offering
these readily observable features more highly regardless of their relationship
to actual performance.
Yet a consideration of the conditions for learning about public affairs
suggests a more optimistic view. Theorists of rational information acqui-
sition (e.g., Downs, 1957) argue that citizens will typically gather only
limited information on matters related to government policies or programs.
This is because acquiring such information typically entails large, immedi-
ate costs — including time, effort, money, and any forgone activities — far
outweighing the uncertain and generally small potential returns. The key
4 A more recent analysis of the search behavior of Washington DC parents using an online
database with information on local schools also found that parents spent more time seeking out
information on the demographic composition of schools’ student bodies than on their academic
performance (Buckley and Schneider, 2007).Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 417
insight from this literature, however, is that information acquisition varies
with costs. Citizens are more likely to gather information available at a rela-
tively low cost, for example through the ‘‘free information stream’’ (media),
through direct exposure to a government service, or as a byproduct of non-
political activities. In the case of public education, this logic suggests that
many citizens will have relevant information about school quality at hand
when forming judgments about them.
Several features of public education lower the cost of information about
schools relative to other areas of government service. First, public schools are
ubiquitous. Americans live among nearly 100,000 public schools operating in
neighborhoods and communities across the country. Millions of Americans
have children in these schools or live among neighbors who do. Proximity to
this service allows citizens to encounter information about local schools with
relative ease, especially if they are parents of school-age children. Parents
of children enrolled in public schools have the opportunity to gain insight
into school performance in their day-to-day interactions with their children,
their children’s peers, and their children’s schools.
Less direct sources of information about schools are also available at rel-
atively low cost. The expansion of school accountability programs in recent
years, particularly in the wake of NCLB, has further reduced the cost of
obtaining information on one aspect of school performance. States and school
districts are legally bound to measure school performance and report this
information to the public. Debate about the quality of this information con-
tinues, but the programs represent a government-sponsored effort to deliver
policy information to the public on a scale rarely (if ever) seen in other pol-
icy domains. Once in the ‘‘free stream’’ — whether through media coverage,
conversations with neighbors and colleagues, or another source — this infor-
mation becomes available to all citizens, even those without direct means of
observing schools, at a reduced cost.
Certain groups of citizens may also have powerful nonpolitical incentives
to attend to school quality. As potential consumers of public education, par-
ents have incentives to be informed about the performance of local schools
that extend well beyond the hope of influencing election outcomes. The
improbability of casting a decisive vote in elections therefore does not erode
the potential returns they may derive from policy information. Meanwhile,
research indicating that school quality has a causal effect on property values
suggests both that homeowners have a financial stake in the performance418 Chingos et al.
of local schools and that the marginal homebuyer is informed about school
quality at the time of purchase (Black, 1999; Figlio and Lucas, 2004).
Given the availability of relatively low-cost information about school
quality, we expect evaluations of schools to reflect this information. We
further expect that parents’ and homeowners’ evaluations of schools will
reflect this information more strongly because of their personal stakes in
the issue. To be clear, we do not argue that citizens walk around with pre-
cise performance indicators (such as proficiency rates on standardized tests)
in their heads. Rather, we argue that citizens’ perceptions of schools will
reflect the information available to them at low cost, whether it is obtained
through direct experience, media coverage of schools, conversations with
colleagues and neighbors, or some similar source. In the case of public edu-
cation, because the available low-cost information in part reflects academic
performance at these schools, so too will citizens’ judgments of them.
Of course, all parents and other citizens may not be created equal when
it comes to obtaining or interpreting performance-related information about
their local schools. Indeed, the possibility that access to information on
school quality is stratified along socioeconomic and racial lines has been a
prominent concern in debates over education policies that expand parental
choice over the school their child attends (Henig, 1994). In a comprehensive
study of parental knowledge in the context of public school choice programs,
Schneider et al. (2000) find that parents who are less educated and from
traditionally disadvantaged minority groups are, on average, less accurate
in describing objective conditions at their children’s schools than are other
parents. At the same time, they also show that more educated parents tend
to rely on their denser social networks as their primary source of informa-
tion about schools, whereas less educated parents tend to rely more heavily
on the media and other formal sources. Given our focus on the relationship
between citizen perceptions and performance information available through
these latter sources, we do not have clear expectations as to whether citizens
who are less advantaged socioeconomically will be differentially responsive
to this information.
A final theoretical concern remains. To the extent that citizen percep-
tions overall do reflect actual conditions at schools, the relationship could
result from either direct observation of performance or information dis-
seminated by accountability programs. Moreover, the relative importance
of these two sources of information may vary across groups such that
government-provided information is more influential for citizens with fewerCitizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 419
alternatives sources of evidence. We suggest that this pattern is likely for two
reasons. First, insofar as information has declining marginal value (Downs,
1957) those who have already acquired information about government have
less incentive to attend to alternative sources which impose additional costs.
Second, even if they do acquire additional information, the impact of these
new messages will be diluted by the balance of preexisting perceptions
(Zaller, 1992). We therefore expect parents to be less influenced by the pub-
lic release of information on school performance because they already have
opportunities to observe schools directly. In contrast, nonparents may rely
more heavily on ratings issued by formal accountability programs and the
coverage those ratings receive from local media outlets. Our empirical anal-
ysis, which exploits newly collected data and recent advances in geo-coding
technology, aims not only to examine the degree to which various groups of
citizens are able to perceive school quality accurately but also to shed light
on potential mechanisms responsible for any observed relationships.
Data on Perceived and Actual Quality of Public Schools
Two data collection challenges have to date hampered analyses of the rela-
tionship between perceived and actual performance. First, analyzing the
relationship between perceived and actual service quality requires placing
subjects within the jurisdictions through which government services are
provided. Until recent advances in geo-coding technology, individuals in
nationally representative surveys could not be assigned reliably to jurisdic-
tional units smaller than counties or cities. Although municipal officials have
authority over certain public services, it would be unwise to assume that the
quality of provision is uniform within their jurisdictions, much less within
congressional districts or states.
In contrast, we are able to link individuals to specific public schools, i.e.,
the institutional level at which the service in question is provided. We use
the 2009 Education Next-Program on Education Policy and Governance
(PEPG) Survey conducted by Knowledge Networks. The results pre-
sented here are based on a nationally representative stratified sample
of 3251 respondents, including oversamples of 434 non-Hispanic blacks,
481 Hispanics, and 948 residents of the state of Florida. The Florida over-
sample was conducted to permit additional analyses that exploit features
of that state’s school accountability program. Samples were drawn from the420 Chingos et al.
probability-based KnowledgePanel and surveys were administered over the
internet between February 25 and March 13, 2009.5
Through this sampling method, respondents were identified by physical
address before the survey was administered. Prior to fielding the survey,
we geo-coded these addresses to latitude–longitude coordinates and census
blocks. We also obtained latitude–longitude coordinates for every U.S. public
school from the U.S. Department of Education National Center for Edu-
cation Statistics’ Common Core of Data School Address File (2006–2007).
Using census blocks to situate respondents within school districts, we then
linked each respondent to the closest public elementary, middle, and high
schools (up to five schools of each type) operated by the school district in
which he/she resides.6
When fielding the survey we presented each respondent with this person-
alized list of the five closest public schools for each school type. The survey
asked all respondents this question: ‘‘Each of the following schools in your
area serves elementary-school students. Which one, if any, do you consider
your local elementary school?’’ Respondents were also allowed to specify a
school that did not appear on the list or to indicate that they did not know
which school they considered their local school. Rather than designating
the school for each respondent to evaluate based on proximity, district stu-
dent assignment practices, or some other arbitrary decision rule, this more
flexible approach allowed respondents to select the school they perceive as
their local public school regardless of whether it is a neighborhood school
or public school of choice (e.g., a magnet or charter school). After a specific
elementary school had been identified, the survey asked the respondent to
grade that school on a scale from A to F. This same process was repeated
for middle and high schools.
Even when subjects can be placed within the appropriate jurisdiction, a
second difficulty remains: obtaining objective measures of service quality
5 KnowledgePanel members are chosen via a probability-based sampling method using known
sampling frames that cover 99% of the U.S. population. Because Knowledge Networks oﬀers
members of its panel free Internet access and a WebTV device that connects to a telephone
and television, the sample is not limited to current computer owners or users with Internet
access.
6 A school was included in the list of nearby elementary schools if it served any grades in K–4
or if it served only grade 5. A school was included as a middle school if it served any grades in
7–8 or if it only served grade 6. A school was included as a high school if it served any grades
in 10–12 or if it only served grade 9. These deﬁnitions imply that many schools, such as those
serving grades K–8 or grades 7–12, were included on multiple lists.Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 421
against which to compare perceptions of individuals living across different
jurisdictions. Over the past two decades, however, state governments have
been collecting more and better data on the academic performance of indi-
vidual schools. We measure school quality as the percentage of students
in a school who achieve ‘‘proficiency’’ in math and reading on the state’s
accountability exams (taking the average proficiency rate across the two
subjects). School-level proficiency data were acquired from GreatSchools,
an online information source on public schools, for the 2007–2008 school
year — the most recent year for which information on test scores would have
been publicly available in all states.7 Because math and reading/English lan-
guage arts proficiency rates are used to evaluate school performance under
NCLB, these indicators are available for virtually every public school in the
United States. Although the rigor of state definitions of math and reading
proficiency varies widely, we can adjust for these differences by restricting
comparisons to respondents within the same state.
The percent of students performing at proficient levels in core academic
subjects is an imperfect measure of school quality, even when comparing
schools in the same state. Given the strong influence of out-of-school factors
on student academic achievement, any quality measure based on the level
at which students are performing at any point in time will be influenced
by the characteristics of a school’s student body. Proficiency-based quality
measures are also insensitive to the performance of schools in promoting
the achievement of students well below or above the proficiency cutoff. At
the same time, proficiency rates are the only objective measure available for
a national sample of schools; they are determined in part by the amount
students learn in school; and research suggests that moving to a school with
higher proficiency rates has a positive impact on student achievement.8
More generally, it is worth noting that the ability to promote math and
reading achievement is hardly the only dimension along which citizens are
7 Missing values in the GreatSchools database are ﬁlled in using an alternative data source,
SchoolDataDirect.org. For a small number of schools for which percent proﬁcient was not
available from either data source in 2007–2008, we use data from the previous school year.
The correlation between school-level percent proﬁcient for 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 is 0.95 in
math and 0.92 in reading/English language arts in the GreatSchools data.
8 For example, see Hastings and Weinstein (2008), which uses data from Charlotte–Mecklenburg
school district in North Carolina (where parents can choose among public schools) and ﬁnds
that providing parents with information on the average test scores of schools increases the
percentage of parents choosing a high-scoring school. In turn, attending a school with higher
test scores increased students’ own test scores by a substantial amount.422 Chingos et al.
likely to evaluate their local schools. To the extent that citizens value educa-
tional goals not reflected in math and reading proficiency rates, our analysis
will be biased against finding that parents are informed about school quality.
In other words, a finding that citizen perceptions of school quality do not
respond to differences in proficiency rates would not necessarily imply that
they are uninformed about the performance of their local schools. Evidence
of responsiveness, however, nonetheless indicates that they are informed
about the performance of schools as measured by state math and reading
tests or about factors correlated with it.
As noted above, perceptions of school quality may be influenced by such
factors as the demographic composition of the student body or school
resources. We therefore also gathered data on the percentage of black and
Hispanic students within each school, the percentage of students eligible for
free or reduced-price lunch (a poverty indicator), average grade cohort sizes
(our preferred measure of school size), and pupil–teacher ratios (a proxy
for class size) from the 2007–2008 NCES Common Core of Data Public
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey Data file.9 We use these vari-
ables to examine their independent relationship with perceptions of school
quality separately and as controls when examining the relationship between
perceived and actual quality.
Empirical Strategy
These data enable us to characterize the relationship between perceived and
actual school quality for a nationally representative sample of American
adults. We pool the relevant data on elementary and middle schools but
exclude high schools from the national analysis. We exclude high schools
because data on the percentage of students who are proficient are not
available for many of them and typically reflect the performance of only
a single cohort of students (because most states test students only once in
high school).
We convert the A–F grades that respondents assigned to their schools
into a standard Grade Point Average (GPA) scale (with A = 4 and F =0 )
9 Missing values in the 2007–2008 ﬁle are ﬁlled in using values from the 2006–2007 if they are
available. Missing values of the pupil–teacher ratio are imputed using the district average.
Average cohort size is calculated as the average of grade enrollments in grades that had enroll-
ments of at least 50 percent of the unadjusted average enrollment per grade (the correlation
between this adjusted measure and a simple average grade enrollment measure is 0.99).Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 423
and use Ordinary Least Squares to regress this variable on school pro-
ficiency rates, demographic characteristics, and resource measures.10 The
latter two sets of variables are included to evaluate the degree to which
perceptions about performance are sensitive to these other observable school
characteristics. We also include a variable identifying middle schools, which
on average have lower proficiency rates and receive lower respondent rat-
ings (even after controlling for proficiency rates). Prior to estimation, we
standardize the continuous independent variables based on the weighted
distribution of elementary and middle schools matched to respondents in
our sample.11 All models are weighted using survey weights provided by
Knowledge Networks to correspond to known demographic characteristics
of the national population, and standard errors are clustered by respondents
to account for the fact that most respondents rated multiple schools. To
assess whether the relationship between perceived and actual school quality
is stronger for parents of school-age children and homeowners, we estimate
models that include dummy variables identifying these two groups and the
interaction between these variables and school proficiency rates.12
Our preferred specification of these models does not include additional
controls for the demographic characteristics of individual survey respon-
dents. Although the literature discussed above has documented correlations
between citizen satisfaction with government services and various demo-
graphic characteristics — chief among them race, income, and education —
these findings could reflect differences across groups in the actual quality
of services received. Given our primary interest in examining the correspon-
dence of actual and perceived quality of services for citizens as a whole,
including controls for demographic characteristics would be inappropriate.
As a practical matter, however, this decision is unimportant: all of the results
10 Ordinary Least Squares regression makes a linearity assumption—namely that the diﬀerence
between any two adjacent respondent ratings (e.g., A and B or D and F) reﬂects the same
diﬀerence in perceived quality. We ﬁnd this assumption intuitively plausible, but we conﬁrmed
that substantively identical results are obtained using ordered probit models, which do not
make this assumption but are more cumbersome to report and interpret. Appendix Table A1
provides the results of our baseline model using ordered probit.
11 The state-level mean of school-level percent proﬁcient varies substantially across states (the
mean is 71 and the standard deviation is 12) but the state-level standard deviation does not (it
has a mean of 13 and a standard deviation of 3). As a result, standardizing percent proﬁcient
within each state produces qualitatively similar results to those reported below.
12 We identify parents of school-age children as respondents who are identiﬁed as parents and
who live in a household with at least one child aged 6–17. As a result, we likely misclassify a
small number of parents whose children do not reside in the same household.424 Chingos et al.
presented below concerning the relationship between perceived and actual
school quality remain substantively identical when we include controls for
race/ethnicity, gender, income, parent status, homeowner status, education,
and age.13
Citizen ratings of school quality could be influenced by unobserved char-
acteristics of the neighborhoods and districts in which respondents reside.
For example, perceptions of school quality may be affected by the quality of
other locally provided public services, such as police and sanitation. Alter-
natively, the demographic composition of respondents’ neighborhoods may
impact their assessment of school quality. As a check on the robustness
of our main results, we therefore also estimate models that condition on
respondent dummies and thus only reflect the extent to which differences
between the characteristics of each respondent’s local elementary and middle
school predict the difference in the ratings the respondent assigned to each
school. The variation in school characteristics with which these models esti-
mate their relationship to citizen ratings is quite limited, as elementary and
middle schools in the same area tend to serve similar students and produce
similar academic results. Estimates of these relationships will therefore be
less precise than in our main specifications. To the extent that they yield
similar point estimates, however, they should mitigate concerns that any
relationships we find are driven by unobserved respondent characteristics or
by neighborhood characteristics that are constant across school levels.
Citizen Ratings and School Characteristics: National Evidence
We begin our analysis of the ratings assigned by the 89 percent of survey
respondents who could identify at least one elementary or middle school by
estimating the relationship between perceived quality and a variety of school
characteristics.14 The (weighted) mean grade assigned to elementary and
middle schools in our sample was 2.57 on a four-point GPA scale, with a
13 These results are available from the authors upon request.
14 Our analysis of the relationship between survey respondents’ ratings of school quality and
objective characteristics of those schools is necessarily limited to respondents who were able to
identify at least one of their local schools. We therefore exclude the 345 respondents who could
not identify their local elementary or middle school. Compared to the 76 percent of respondents
who could name both their elementary and middle schools, the 11 percent of our sample who
could identify neither is modestly better educated but less likely to be a parent of a child
aged 6–17 or a homeowner (see Appendix Table A2). (Applying the survey weights, 14 percent
of respondents identiﬁed neither school and 86 percent identiﬁed at least one.) A regressionCitizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 425
standard deviation of 0.90.15 Because all continuous independent variables
have been standardized based on the distribution of elementary and middle
schools matched to sample respondents, the coefficient estimates reported
in the tables and text indicate the effect of a one-standard-deviation change
in each variable on citizen ratings.
Column 1 in Table 1 confirms that student proficiency rates are a sig-
nificant predictor of respondent ratings of school quality. Holding constant
other school characteristics, an increase of 18 percentage points in percent
proficient is associated with a rating that is on average 0.15 grade points
higher — an effect that is moderate in size relative to the standard deviation
in respondent ratings of 0.9 grade points. Among demographic character-
istics of schools, only the poverty indicator exhibits predictive power; the
coefficients on percent black and Hispanic are statistically insignificant and
sufficiently precise to rule out even small relationships between these indi-
cators and quality ratings. Average cohort size and pupil–teacher ratio
only weakly predict respondent ratings. In fact, the relationship between
pupil–teacher ratio and school ratings is in the opposite of the expected
direction: schools with larger classes receive somewhat higher grades, per-
haps because effective schools attract more families.16
These results reflect variation in ratings and school characteristics both
across respondents (who are generally rating schools in different neighbor-
hoods) and within respondents (because most respondents rated both their
analysis conﬁrms that, holding constant the respondent characteristics included in Table A2,
parents of school-age children are 9 percentage points more likely than nonparents to identify
either their local elementary or middle school and homeowners were 12 percentage points more
likely than non-homeowners to do so. No other respondent characteristics are signiﬁcantly
associated with the probability of being able to identify their local schools.
15 More speciﬁcally, the distribution of respondent ratings was 14 percent A, 41 percent B,
36 percent C, 7 percent D, and 2 percent F.
16 One potential concern with the analysis is that it is based only on the sample of respondents
who were willing and able to identify their local school. To the extent that citizens who failed
to identify their local school are less informed about school quality, our results would represent
an upper bound on the responsiveness of perceptions to quality. As a robustness check, we
replicated our main results with respondents who did not identify their local school matched to
the geographically closest public school. This was possible because even though these respon-
dents could not identify their local school by name, the vast majority nonetheless provided
a rating of the quality of that school. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient on percent proﬁcient
attenuates (from 0.15 to 0.10 in models without respondent dummies) but remains statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and is not statistically distinguishable from the result using the more limited
sample. This attenuation could stem from respondents having rated a school diﬀerent from the
nearby school to which we assigned them for this analysis or could suggest that respondents
who failed to identify their local school are in fact less informed.426 Chingos et al.
Table 1. Relationship between school characteristics and respondents’
ratings.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percent proficient 0.149 0.101 0.115 0.163 −0.059
(unit is 18 points) [0.051] [0.094] [0.050] [0.059] [0.124]
Percent black 0.010 −0.153 0.009 0.010 −0.147
(unit is 25 points) [0.042] [0.120] [0.042] [0.043] [0.122]
Percent Hispanic −0.007 −0.182 −0.007 −0.006 −0.184
(unit is 24 points) [0.039] [0.146] [0.039] [0.040] [0.145]
Percent free lunch −0.174 0.001 −0.176 −0.175 0.013
(unit is 26 points) [0.042] [0.096] [0.043] [0.042] [0.096]
Average cohort size −0.047 −0.081 −0.048 −0.047 −0.075
(unit is 133 students) [0.025] [0.038] [0.025] [0.025] [0.037]
Pupil–teacher ratio 0.056 0.032 0.058 0.056 0.037
(unit is 3.2 students) [0.028] [0.046] [0.028] [0.028] [0.046]
Middle school −0.182 −0.124 −0.179 −0.183 −0.123
[0.041] [0.057] [0.041] [0.041] [0.057]
Parent with child aged −0.867
6–17 in household [0.265]
Percent proficient ∗ parent 0.216 0.448
with child aged 6–17 [0.064] [0.232]
in household
Homeowner 0.075
[0.213]
Percent −0.021 0.117
proficient ∗ homeowner [0.053] [0.130]
State dummies? Yes No Yes Yes No
Respondent dummies? No Yes No No Yes
Observations 5039 5039 5039 5039 5039
R-squared 0.171 0.865 0.179 0.171 0.869
Notes: Standard errors adjusted for clustering within respondents appear in brackets.
All regressions employ survey weights. All continuous variables have been standardized
based on the distribution of elementary and middle schools matched to respondents in
our sample. In columns (3) and (5), omitted category includes nonparents and parents
without children aged 6–17 living in their household.Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 427
elementary and middle schools). Thus the positive coefficient on percent
proficient could reflect unobserved differences between school districts or
neighborhoods. We address this concern by estimating the same model while
controlling for respondent dummies. The results with respondent dummies
(column 2) are less precise, as is expected given the limited variation with
which they are estimated. The coefficient on percent proficient is reduced
by one-third and is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels
due to its larger standard error. The coefficient on percent free lunch falls
essentially to zero, most likely due to the fact that there is very little within-
respondent variation in this variable. The final notable change between the
models is that average cohort size is now a stronger predictor of respon-
dent ratings (with respondents preferring schools with fewer students in each
grade), although the magnitude of this effect is still quite modest.17
We next turn to whether the performance-rating relationship is stronger
for parents of school-age children and homeowners. The third column of
Table 1 confirms that the coefficient on percent proficient is nearly three
times as large for parents of school-age children as it is for other respondents:
0.33 vs. 0.12. In other words, a one-standard-deviation increase in percent
proficient is associated with a rating from parents that is one-third of a
letter grade higher. The large negative coefficient on the parent main effect
coupled with the positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that
parents give low-scoring schools lower ratings than nonparents, but that
this difference narrows and eventually reverses as proficiency rates increase.
This pattern is evident in Figure 1, which plots the predicted ratings as
a function of percent proficient (with all other variables held constant at
17 The national sample also allow us to examine the degree to which citizen ratings of school
quality are responsive to performance levels relative to the nation as a whole or simply to
relative diﬀerences in performance within speciﬁc states. The National Assessment of Edu-
cational Progress (NAEP) conducted every two years by the U.S. Department of Education
provides evidence on the average performance of fourth- and eighth-grade students in each
state in mathematics and reading. We use these data to see whether respondents in states with
higher average scores on the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) rate their
schools higher, on average, than respondents in states with lower NAEP scores. That is, if
we compare two respondents whose local schools have the same percent proﬁcient (and other
characteristics), does the one in the state with better schools (as measured by student per-
formance on the NAEP) give him/her school a better rating? The results (available from the
authors upon request) provide no evidence that respondents in general, or even parents, have
information about school quality beyond the information provided on the state assessments.
In other words, citizens appear to be taking cues about school quality from local comparisons
or from information provided by their state testing system without taking into account the
relative diﬃculty of state standards.428 Chingos et al.
Figure 1. Relationship between student performance on state tests and
respondents’ school ratings.
Note: The top panel plots predicted ratings by proﬁciency rate based on the model pre-
sented in column 3 of Table 1 with all control variables (including state dummies) held
constant at their means. The bottom panel plots the diﬀerence in predicted ratings between
the two groups and its 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
their means) for parents and nonparents in the top panel and the predicted
difference between the two groups (and its 95 percent confidence interval) in
the bottom panel. Perhaps surprisingly, the same pattern does not emerge
for homeowners, who appear to be no more sensitive to differences in school
quality than non-homeowners (column 4). This result and the relationship
between actual and perceived quality for parents are robust to the inclusion
of respondent dummies. In fact, the within-respondent point estimate of the
performance-rating relationship for parents of school-age children reportedCitizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 429
in column 5 is even larger (0.39 and statistically significant at the 10 percent
level, although it is imprecisely estimated).
Why are homeowners no more sensitive to actual performance than non-
homeowners? Perhaps the salience of school performance for homeowners
peaks only at times of sale or purchase, whereas parents face sustained incen-
tives to follow school quality. The differences between these groups could
also imply that information costs matter more than benefits. Both parents
and homeowners have incentives to pay attention to school quality, but par-
ents likely have more opportunities to observe performance directly than do
homeowners. Our data do not allow for final resolution among the several
possibilities.
Table 2 considers whether the degree to which citizens are informed about
school quality varies with other demographic characteristics. As noted above,
although some research suggests that socioeconomically disadvantaged par-
ents have lower levels of information about their local schools, the relevance
of these findings to responsiveness to publicly reported performance indica-
tors is unclear. Compared to the performance-rating relationship for whites,
we find that the relationship among blacks and Hispanics is approximately
the same. This relationship is also essentially the same for high-income and
more-educated respondents as it is for low-income and less-educated respon-
dents. We do find suggestive evidence that blacks are more sensitive to the
racial makeup of schools, whereas whites and Hispanics are more sensitive to
the socioeconomic composition. Another notable difference between groups
in Table 2 is that the ‘‘middle school penalty’’ is more than twice as large
for parents as compared to non-parents.
Performance Levels vs. Growth? Evidence from Florida
Our analysis of nationally representative data yields strong evidence that
citizens, and especially parents of school-age children, rate schools in a way
that lines up with the level of student performance at those schools. As noted
above, however, test-score levels reflect not only the amount students learn
in school but also their background and experiences in other settings. To
examine the responsiveness of citizen perceptions to measures of test-score
growth, which may be more reflective of what schools actually accomplish,
we turn to our oversample of survey respondents in the state of Florida,430 Chingos et al.
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where the state accountability system evaluates schools based on both test-
score levels and test-score growth.
The Florida Department of Education assigns each Florida school a letter
grade between A and F based primarily on a points system with eight main
components, which we divide into two categories:
(1) Level-related points: percent of students in tested grades who are pro-
ficient in math, reading, writing, and science (the four percentages are
summed to calculate the total level-related points)
(2) Growth-related points: percent of students in tested grades making learn-
ing gains in math and reading and the percent of the lowest 25 percent
of students making gains in math and reading (the four percentages are
summed to calculate the total growth-related points).
The level-related points variable (calculated using publicly available data
from the Florida Department of Education) is highly correlated with the
percent proficient measure used in the national analysis (r =0 .92); the cor-
relation between the growth-related points variable and percent proficient
is only 0.58.18
Our basic strategy is to regress the ratings Florida residents assigned to
their schools on variables measuring level-related and growth-related points
and the same demographic and school characteristics used in the national
analysis. Because measures of test-score growth are less stable over time
than measures of test-score levels (Kane and Staiger, 2002), we average the
points awarded to each school based on levels and growth over the previous
three years.19 In Florida, data on percent proficient are widely available
for high schools and reflect the performance of both ninth- and tenth-grade
students, so we include them along with the elementary and middle schools
(adding a variable identifying high schools to all of the models) to maximize
our sample size. Finally, to make the results as comparable as possible to
those reported for the national sample, we rescale the points variables such
that a one-unit increase in each corresponds to a one-standard-deviation
18 Both correlations are for the speciﬁc schools matched to our survey respondents and incorporate
survey weights.
19 Among Florida schools, the correlation between level-related points in 2007 and 2008 was 0.92,
as compared to 0.39 for growth-related points. This reﬂects the fact that measures of test-
score growth, which involve taking the diﬀerence between two error-prone measures of student
achievement, suﬀer from more measurement error and therefore have a lower signal-to-noise
ratio. Although actual school quality may change from year to year, the beneﬁts of reducing
measurement error likely outweigh the drawbacks of relying on a single year of data.432 Chingos et al.
shift in the performance distribution of Florida public schools matched to
respondents.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that Florida residents’ perceptions of school
quality are even more responsive to differences in student achievement levels
than are those of the national public (and are unrelated to school demo-
graphics). A one-standard-deviation increase in level-related points is associ-
ated with ratings that are one-fifth of a letter grade higher. The results also
suggest that ratings of school quality are related to student growth, but the
coefficient on level-related points is almost twice as large as the coefficient
on growth-related points. Moreover, only the coefficient on the level-related
points variable remains statistically significant when respondent dummies
are added (column 2). As in the national analysis, the relationships between
school performance measures and respondent ratings are particularly strong
for parents of school-age children. The coefficient on level-related points is
roughly three times as large for parents (column 3) as for nonparents. How-
ever, parents are no more responsive to the measure of growth-related points
than nonparents. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that citizen ratings
do reflect differences in the growth in student achievement across schools
but that this is primarily because of the correlation between achievement
growth and achievement levels.
The Eﬀect of Accountability Ratings: Regression Discontinuity Evidence
Although the results presented above indicate that on average citizens’ rat-
ings of schools are reflective of student performance, we do not know how
they acquire this information. Our finding of differential effects for parents
but not for homeowners suggests that direct interaction with a school may
play an important role, but what of nonparents? Through school account-
ability programs, states have subsidized the cost of information by collecting
performance measures and releasing them to the public. Does this subsidized
information shape citizen perceptions?
As noted above, the Florida Department of Education uses the total
number of points received (i.e., the sum of level- and growth-related points),
along with other factors, to assign each school a letter grade. These grades
receive considerable media attention in Florida, so we might expect respon-
dents’ school ratings to be correlated with them. Indeed, we should expect
to find this given that level-related points (which are correlated withCitizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 433
Table 3. Relationship between test-score levels/growth and respondents’
school ratings, Florida.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3-year average of level-related 0.211 0.230 0.145 0.183
points (unit is 41 points) [0.064] [0.082] [0.066] [0.093]
3-year average of growth-related 0.112 −0.001 0.123 0.001
points (unit is 20 points) [0.052] [0.061] [0.060] [0.070]
Percent black −0.012 −0.051 −0.016 −0.050
(unit is 21 points) [0.045] [0.106] [0.045] [0.104]
Percent Hispanic 0.076 0.050 0.078 0.030
(unit is 18 points) [0.039] [0.123] [0.039] [0.118]
Percent free lunch −0.040 −0.066 −0.041 −0.050
(unit is 21 points) [0.059] [0.090] [0.060] [0.085]
Average cohort size −0.110 −0.091 −0.114 −0.083
(unit is 210 students) [0.054] [0.072] [0.054] [0.070]
Pupil-teacher ratio −0.009 −0.014 −0.009 −0.022
(unit is 2.4 students) [0.044] [0.051] [0.044] [0.050]
Middle school −0.116 −0.142 −0.116 −0.144
[0.075] [0.088] [0.075] [0.088]
High school 0.158 −0.007 0.147 −0.016
[0.133] [0.130] [0.137] [0.134]
Parent with child age 6–17 −0.464
[0.732]
3-year average of level-related 0.307 0.216
points (unit is 41 points) ∗ parent [0.114] [0.161]
3-year average of growth-related −0.116 −0.059
points (unit is 20 points) ∗ parent [0.091] [0.113]
Respondent dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 2227 2227 2227 2227
R-squared 0.136 0.778 0.147 0.780
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering within respondents appear in brackets. All
regressions employ survey weights. All continuous variables have been standardized based
on the distribution of schools matched to respondents in our Florida oversample.434 Chingos et al.
Table 4. Relationship between school grades and respondents’ school
ratings, Florida.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FL Grade (4-point scale) 0.174 0.103
[0.039] [0.054]
FL Grade = B (relative to A) −0.137 0.067
[0.087] [0.100]
FL Grade = C (relative to A) −0.223 −0.098
[0.104] [0.127]
FL Grade = D (relative to A) −0.550 −0.380
[0.138] [0.165]
FL Grade = F (relative to A) −1.152 −0.633
[0.264] [0.300]
Respondent dummies? No Yes No Yes
Observations 2209 2209 2209 2209
R-squared 0.123 0.774 0.128 0.778
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering within respondents appear in brackets.
All regressions employ survey weights. All regressions include school-level controls
(indicators for middle and high school, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent free
lunch, average cohort size, and pupil-teacher ratio).
respondent ratings) are a key component in the grades formula. Table 4
confirms this expectation: a school grade that is one point higher (again mea-
sured on a standard GPA scale) is associated with a respondent rating that
is 0.2 grades higher. Column 3, which treats each grade as a separate vari-
able, shows that the relationship between accountability system grades and
respondent ratings appears to be largest for the lowest two grades (D and F).
Columns 2 and 4 confirm that these results are robust to (although atten-
uated by) the inclusion of respondent dummies. Although these patterns
suggest that the state-assigned grades may have a causal impact on citizen
evaluations, they could simply reflect the correlation between those grades
and citizens’ direct observations.
To test the hypothesis that public information has a causal impact on
citizen perceptions that is in addition to any impact of direct observation of
quality, we use regression discontinuity methods to estimate the impact ofCitizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 435
the school grades in Florida on respondent ratings by comparing respondents
whose schools were close to the numerical cutoffs in the points variable that
determines the school grades.20 Because the quality of schools and respon-
dent characteristics should vary continuously at these cutoffs, we can inter-
pret any jump in the rating observed at the cutoff as the pure information
effect of the school grade on respondents’ perceptions of school quality.21
Only a handful of respondents were matched to schools close to the D/F
and C/D cutoffs due to the fact that relatively few Florida schools receive
D or F grades, precluding us from examining these cutoffs separately. We
implement the regression discontinuity for the A/B and B/C cutoffs by
regressing the respondent ratings on a dummy for receiving the higher grade,
the number of points received, an interaction between the grade dummy
and points variable, and the controls included throughout our analyses. We
run these models including schools within different ranges of points from
the cutoff (‘‘bandwidths’’). Ideally, the results will not be sensitive to the
selection of bandwidth (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).22
The results for the A/B cutoff (available upon request) are all statisti-
cally insignificant but sufficiently imprecise that even large effects cannot be
ruled out. However, results for the B/C cutoff presented in the first panel of
Table 5 suggest a large positive effect of receiving the higher (B) grade on
respondent ratings, with a magnitude in the range of 0.36–0.57. The effect
is imprecisely estimated, but it is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level with one of the bandwidths and at the 10 percent level with the other
two. Appendix Table A3 tests for discontinuities in respondent character-
istics at the same cutoff, finding very little evidence to suggest that the
20 The total points variable is a sum of the level- and growth-related points variables and, for
high schools, an additional “bonus points” variable that awards 10 points to schools in which
at least 50 percent of grade 10 students who initially failed the state’s graduation test passed
when retested. School grades are sometimes also determined by other factors, such as failure
to test at least a certain percentage of their students. Schools for whom the points variable did
not bind (e.g., schools just below the cutoﬀ that would not have received the higher grade had
they earned points above the cutoﬀ) are excluded from the discontinuity analysis.
21 Our methods are similar to those of West and Peterson (2006) and Chiang (2009), who exploit
the discontinuities in the Florida accountability system to estimate the impact of receiving
various school grades on student achievement.
22 We also examined the density of the points variable used to assign school grades within the
total population of Florida public schools, ﬁnding no evidence that schools are concentrated in
points ranges just above the grade cutoﬀs. The absence of such clustering suggests that schools
are unable to manipulate the points variable strategically in order to obtain a higher school
grade (e.g., by putting forth just enough eﬀort to get above a cutoﬀ).436 Chingos et al.
Table 5. Regression discontinuity estimates of accountability grade
effect on respondent ratings.
B/C cutoﬀ only: Bandwidth (Points)
15 20 25
Higher Grade 0.569 0.410 0.363
(Relative to Lower Grade) [0.270] [0.242] [0.196]
Points (0 = Grade Threshold) −0.006 0.002 0.005
[0.023] [0.024] [0.014]
Higher Grade ∗ Points −0.036 −0.026 −0.024
[0.034] [0.030] [0.019]
Observations 284 367 461
R-squared 0.175 0.111 0.105
All cutoﬀs pooled: Bandwidth (Points)
15 20 25
Higher Grade 0.264 0.224 0.323
(Relative to Lower Grade) [0.155] [0.140] [0.141]
Points (0 = Grade Threshold) 0.002 0.002 −0.010
[0.014] [0.011] [0.006]
Higher Grade ∗ Points −0.011 −0.007 0.004
[0.020] [0.014] [0.007]
Observations 770 1038 1317
R-squared 0.120 0.090 0.091
All cutoﬀs pooled: Bandwidth (Points)
15 20 25
Higher Grade 0.327 0.255 0.340
(Relative to Lower Grade) [0.155] [0.141] [0.142]
Points (0 = Grade Threshold) 0.002 0.002 −0.010
[0.014] [0.011] [0.006]
Higher Grade ∗ Points −0.010 −0.004 0.005
[0.020] [0.014] [0.007]
Higher Grade ∗ Parent −0.440 −0.266 −0.113
[0.219] [0.192] [0.142]
Parent 0.022 0.043 −0.022
[0.175] [0.172] [0.134]
Observations 770 1038 1317
R-squared 0.135 0.096 0.093
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering within respondents appear in brackets.
All regressions employ survey weights. All regressions include school-level controls
(indicators for middle and high school, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent free
lunch, average cohort size, and pupil-teacher ratio).Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 437
assumptions of the regression discontinuity model do not hold.23 Similarly,
Appendix Table A4 reports the results of placebo tests which look for dis-
continuities in citizen perceptions at false cutoffs 15 points above and below
those actually used to distinguish B and C schools. The effects estimated at
these false cutoffs are all statistically insignificant and inconsistently signed
across bandwidths, further strengthening confidence in the validity of the
regression discontinuity design. That the school grades have a direct effect
on respondent ratings over and above the relationship between ratings and
the underlying points variable suggests that citizens are attentive to the
signals provided by the state’s school accountability system.
As discussed above, nonparents have fewer alternative sources of infor-
mation about school quality and therefore may be more responsive than
parents to the signals provided by accountability systems. In order to
distinguish between parents and nonparents in the regression discontinuity
analysis while retaining sufficient statistical power, we pool respondents
across each of the four available grade cutoffs — effectively constraining the
effects of receiving a higher grade to be the same across the A-F scale. The
second panel of Table 5 shows, for different bandwidths, an average grade
effect in the range of 0.22–0.32 (one estimate is statistically significant
at the 5 percent level and another is significant at the 10 percent level).
As in the case of the B/C cutoff, tests for discontinuities in respondent
characteristics and placebo tests for effects on citizen perceptions reported
in Tables A3 and A4 suggest that the regression discontinuity model
remains valid in this pooled setup.
The bottom panel of this table allows the effect of a higher school grade
to differ for parents and nonparents. The effect for nonparents is in the
0.26–0.34 range, and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level for two
of the bandwidths and at the 10 percent level for another. The effect for par-
ents is never statistically significant, and the difference between parents and
nonparents is statistically significant for one bandwidth and large enough
to be substantively important across all three bandwidths. Although the
relative imprecision of these estimates warrants caution, they suggest that
nonparents are more responsive to the signals about school quality provided
by public accountability programs than are parents.
23 The probability that a respondent is male increases modestly at the cutoﬀ, a result that
is statistically signiﬁcant for two bandwidths. However, the results presented in Table 5 are
substantively unchanged in models that control for the full set of respondent characteristics
included in Table 4.438 Chingos et al.
Conclusions
We have provided what is, to our knowledge, the first evidence that citizen
perceptions of the quality of government services reflect objective measures
of performance of the specific institution providing the service. More specif-
ically, we find that the grades Americans assign to their local public school
reflect publicly available information about the academic achievement of its
students. Although we cannot directly examine the mechanisms explaining
this responsiveness, our evidence suggests that both direct experience with
schools and the public dissemination of performance data may play a role.
Interestingly, the signals provided by accountability systems appear to have
the greatest influence on nonparents, who have the least opportunity for
direct contact with public schools.
It is worth emphasizing the limitations on this evidence of responsiveness.
First, the relationship between actual and perceived quality, although quite
strong for parents, is relatively modest for citizens as a whole. Second, it
appears that both parents and the general public are more responsive to the
level of student achievement at a school as opposed to the amount students
learn from one year to the next, which may in fact be more reflective of
service quality. Nor do we have direct evidence that perceptions of school
quality influence citizens’ behavior in the context of school board elections,
local political activism, or school choice.
Finally, it is worth asking whether these results are transferable to other
policy domains. Are schools a special case? The widespread use of account-
ability systems in public education and the availability of other sources of
low-cost information about schools might suggest so. We cannot know the
answer to this question, but the regression discontinuity evidence for non-
parents suggests that individuals can judge government performance more
accurately if information is provided, even in the absence of other low-cost
sources.
Nevertheless, both policy and theoretical implications emerge from our
results. First, our finding that citizens’ assessments of their local schools are
impacted by accountability ratings suggest that public reporting of govern-
mental performance can in fact inform the citizenry. However, the fact that
respondent ratings of schools are more strongly associated with achievement
levels than with achievement growth suggests that citizens are most likely to
pick up and rely upon the information most subsidized by these efforts. In
the case of public education, featuring growth measures more prominentlyCitizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 439
in school accountability ratings could cause citizens to pay more attention
to this aspect of school quality.
Our results also have implications for democratic theory in the context of
local politics. With few exceptions (e.g., Berry and Howell, 2007), work on
retrospective voting has focused on behavior in federal elections. By showing
that voter decisions correspond to objective economic indicators, this body
of research suggests that voters are sufficiently informed about government
performance to hold parties and politicians accountable regarding that issue.
This article does not go quite as far in the case of public education; we do
not look downstream at how perceptions shape electoral choice. However,
we provide evidence of a critical link that must precede the vote decision.
For accountability systems to generate public pressure on officials governing
schools, citizens must pay attention to the information these systems pro-
vide. In demonstrating that the public does pay attention to the quality of
schools we establish a necessary condition for democratic accountability —
a link more often assumed than tested.
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Table A1. Relationship between school characteristics and respondents’
school ratings, marginal effects from ordered probit models.
Marginal effect on probability of giving a grade of:
ABCDF
Percent proficient 0.041 0.033 −0.050 −0.017 −0.007
(unit is 18 points) [0.014] [0.011] [0.017] [0.006] [0.003]
Percent black 0.004 0.003 −0.005 −0.002 −0.001
(unit is 25 points) [0.011] [0.009] [0.014] [0.005] [0.002]
Percent Hispanic −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(unit is 24 points) [0.011] [0.009] [0.013] [0.004] [0.002]
Percent free lunch −0.051 −0.040 0.061 0.021 0.009
(unit is 26 points) [0.012] [0.010] [0.014] [0.005] [0.002]
Average cohort size −0.014 −0.011 0.017 0.006 0.002
(unit is 133 students) [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.003] [0.001]
Pupil-teacher ratio 0.015 0.012 −0.019 −0.006 −0.003
(unit is 3.2 students) [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.003] [0.001]
Middle school −0.050 −0.040 0.060 0.021 0.009
[0.011] [0.010] [0.014] [0.005] [0.002]
Overall probability 2.4% 6.9% 35.6% 40.8% 14.2%
Observations 5039 5039 5039 5039 5039
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering within respondents appear in brackets.
All regressions employ survey weights. Reported coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects from
ordered probit regressions. All regressions include state dummy variables. All continuous
variables have been standardized based on the distribution of elementary and middle
schools matched to respondents in our sample.Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 443
Table A2. Descriptive statistics, by whether respondent identified local
elementary and middle schools.
Identified
All
Respondents Neither One of Two Both
Age 46.5 46.0 46.9 46.5
Male 49% 46% 47% 50%
Black 12% 14% 18%+ 10%*
Hispanic 13% 11% 19%∗∗ 12%
Income $57,972 $57,898 $49,771∗∗ $59,655
College Degree 27% 34% 20%∗∗ 27%∗∗
Parent of Child 6-17 15% 3% 8%∗ 19%∗∗
Homeowner 73% 58% 53%+ 79%∗∗
Number (unweighted) 3251 345 447 2459
Percent (weighted) 100% 14% 15% 72%
Note: Statistical signiﬁcance from the mean for “neither” is indicated at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels by
+,
∗, and
∗∗, respectively. All averages are weighted unless otherwise
indicated. Of those respondents that could only name 1 of 2 schools, 64% named their
local elementary school.444 Chingos et al.
Table A3. Regression discontinuity estimates of accountability
grade effect on respondent characteristics.
B/C cutoﬀ only: Bandwidth (Points)
Dependent variable 15 20 25
Parent 0.124 −0.030 −0.020
[0.085] [0.088] [0.081]
Homeowner −0.103 −0.012 0.006
[0.140] [0.120] [0.106]
Black 0.088 0.103 0.015
[0.104] [0.102] [0.090]
Hispanic −0.005 −0.003 −0.026
[0.064] [0.071] [0.075]
College graduate 0.092 −0.019 0.045
[0.133] [0.098] [0.085]
Male 0.394 0.243 0.156
[0.145] [0.134] [0.126]
Log(Income) 0.216 0.143 0.056
[0.294] [0.236] [0.227]
All cutoﬀs pooled: Bandwidth (Points)
Dependent variable 15 20 25
Parent 0.020 −0.110 −0.020
[0.093] [0.083] [0.084]
Homeowner −0.174 −0.114 −0.146
[0.088] [0.083] [0.087]
Black 0.118 0.132 0.131
[0.068] [0.074] [0.078]
Hispanic 0.047 0.032 0.015
[0.071] [0.059] [0.055]
College graduate 0.039 0.029 −0.036
[0.086] [0.078] [0.071]
Male 0.060 −0.042 0.042
[0.095] [0.086] [0.090]
Log(Income) 0.134 0.127 −0.016
[0.187] [0.172] [0.148]
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering within respondents appear in
brackets. All regressions employ survey weights. All regressions include school-
level controls (indicators for middle and high school, percent black, percent
Hispanic, percent free lunch, average cohort size, and pupil-teacher ratio).Citizen Perceptions of Government Service Quality 445
Table A4. Regression discontinuity estimates of accountability grade effect
on respondent ratings, false cutoffs.
B/C cutoff only: Bandwidth (Points)
15 20 25
Increase cutoff by 15 points 0.165 0.206 −0.028
[0.375] [0.321] [0.302]
Decrease cutoff by 15 points 0.089 −0.209 −0.261
[0.254] [0.221] [0.205]
All cutoffs pooled: Bandwidth (Points)
15 20 25
Increase cutoff by 15 points −0.132 −0.181 −0.290
[0.215] [0.179] [0.178]
Decrease cutoff by 15 points −0.131 −0.152 −0.166
[0.181] [0.153] [0.139]
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering within respondents appear in brackets. All
regressions employ survey weights. All regressions include school-level controls (indicators
for middle and high school, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent free lunch, average
cohort size, and pupil-teacher ratio).